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Abstract 
A country’s visa policies are widely assumed to have economic consequences. In this short 
paper, I examine the effect of the ease with which a country’s citizens can enter foreign 
countries on international trade. Using a specification of the gravity model that avoids the 
endogeneity problems that typically arise when analyzing the association between ease of 
travel and the extent of bilateral interactions, I find that countries which issue powerful 
passports experience more international trade. 
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1. Introduction 
Diplomacy, i.e., a government’s practice of conducting international relationships, often has 
measurable economic consequences. Diplomatic efforts, such as a country’s membership and 
cooperation in multilateral organizations, have the potential to promote cross-border 
interaction; Rose (2005), for instance, examines the effect of various international institutions 
on trade. Likewise, failures of diplomacy, such as interstate conflicts and wars, are typically 
found to substantially harm growth; Blomberg and Hess (2012) and Polachek and 
Sevastianova (2012), among others, estimate the cost of conflict on welfare and per capita 
income. 
Apart from these consequences, the economic effects of diplomacy have recently attracted 
growing attention for (at least) two other reasons. First, the role and purpose of diplomatic 
activities have changed considerably over the last few decades. While some traditional 
functions of the diplomatic service, such as the collection of information about developments 
abroad, have largely disappeared, other tasks have gained in importance, including tasks 
based on economic motives. Second, diplomacy is costly. The foreign service, for instance, 
requires sizable operational expenditures. More notably, membership in international 
organizations typically requires obligations which ultimately imply a loss of national 
sovereignty. In view of the transfers involved, both in terms of money and power, cost-benefit 
analyses of diplomatic activities have been recently in growing demand. 
Diplomatic efforts can take various forms; they range from negotiating treaties and 
agreements to the operation of permanent presence posts, such as embassies, in foreign 
countries. As a result, given this diversity, a sizable literature already examines the economic 
effects of a wide range of diplomatic activities. Rose (2016), for instance, documents, at a 
very general level, that a country’s ‘soft power’ also matters commercially; countries that are 
perceived to be exerting a positive global influence are found to export more to their admirers. 
At another extreme, Nitsch (2007) analyzes the effects of a very specific form of diplomacy, 
state visits, finding that official travels by heads of state tend to benefit bilateral trade with the 
host country. 
In this short paper, I explore the effects of another feature of diplomatic efforts, a country’s 
willingness and ability to facilitate easy cross-border travel for its citizens. 1 In practice, 
                                                            
1 Bangwayo-Skeete and Skeete (2017) take a different perspective. Aiming to identify 
determinants of a country’s visa policies, they find, for instance, that membership in the 
European Union is associated with more visa-free travel privileges. 
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administrative procedures for entering and exiting a country are one of the most visible 
aspects of the foreign policy of a sovereign state; they are also one of the most important 
foreign policy areas. The U.S. Department of State, for instance, notes on its website: 
“Consular Affairs (CA) is the public face of the Department of State for millions of people 
around the world [...] These far-reaching consular activities have broad foreign policy and 
domestic political implications and involve serious legal, humanitarian, and management 
concerns. [...] CA is also the Department’s largest Bureau in terms of domestic personnel and 
is almost entirely funded through revenue generated by consular fees. This revenue totaled 
$4.16 billion in 2015, making CA the equivalent of a Fortune 600 company.”2 
Visa policies have many facets, including, among others, the requirements to be fulfilled for 
being granted an entry visa, the time it takes to be granted approval for a visa, and the period 
of allowed stay. In view of the heterogeneity of measures and procedures, I quantify the 
overall conditions for crossing a country’s borders by the number of countries and territories 
that can be entered by its citizens without a visa. In particular, it is argued that the ultimate 
aim of governmental efforts to lower restrictions on cross-border travel is to facilitate 
unhindered mobility. Previous studies, in contrast, have exclusively focused on the economic 
impact of very specific visa policy measures. Neiman and Swagel (2009), for example, 
examine stricter U.S. rules and procedures enacted on visa applications after the 
September 11, 2001, attacks, finding that countries participating in the visa waiver program 
(and, therefore, unaffected by these changes) experienced a larger decline in travelers. Other 
studies analyze the pairwise association between visa-free travel and bilateral economic 
activity, such as Davis and Gift’s (2014) assessment of the trade effects of the abolition of 
border controls between the member countries of the Schengen Agreement, Neumayer’s 
(2011) analysis of the effects of visa restrictions on trade and investment or Czaika and 
Neumayer’s (2017) study of the effects of visa policies on cross-border mobility. As many of 
these policy measures, however, are dyadic in nature, the analyses face potential endogeneity 
concerns where restrictions to travel are influenced by the extent of bilateral interactions. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
In order to identify the effect of a country’s visa policies, I estimate an augmented gravity 
model which has been highly successful in explaining patterns of international trade. In 
particular, following Head and Mayer (2014) and others, I use a ‘least squares with country 
                                                            
2 See https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/about.html. 
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dummy variables’ estimator, where fixed effects for the exporter and importer account for any 
factor that shifts the overall level of exports or imports of a country. As these factors include a 
country’s overall visa policies, I construct from this monadic variable a new dyadic variable, 
which is identifiable in this setting and explained in more detail below. Specifically, I 
estimate equations of the form: 
(1) ln(Xij) =  VisaiVisaj + n n Zij + i + j + ij ,  
where Xij denotes nominal exports from country i to country j, VisaiVisaj is the dyadic 
measure of the exporter’s and importer’s cross-border mobility, Z is a vector of auxiliary 
dyadic control variables (such as the geographic distance between i and j), i and j are 
comprehensive sets of exporter and importer fixed effects respectively, and ij is a residual to 
represent all other influences on exports. 
Since countries with close trade ties to one another are also more likely to allow for visa-free 
travel between each other, I examine the effects of a country’s overall openness to cross-
border mobility on trade. In particular, I make use of a new data set, obtained from Arton 
Capital, a global financial advisory firm, on the number of countries and territories that can be 
entered by a country’s citizens without a visa. By multiplying the share of countries to which 
a passport holder from i has visa-free access times the share of countries to which a passport 
holder from j can travel visa-free, I obtain a dyadic travel mobility variable, the probability 
that a pair of randomly selected individuals from the two countries will be able to visit each 
other without the need for a travel visa, which is independent of the actual diplomatic 
relationship between the two countries. 
Data on the number of a country’s visa-free (or visa on arrival) agreements, the Visa-Free 
Score, are available for 199 countries and territories, covering the period from 2015 onwards 
in annual frequency.3 The current (2018) scores range from 25 for Afghanistan to 164 for 
Singapore. In view of the short time span of available data, I estimate a cross-section gravity 
model, analyzing bilateral patterns of trade in 2016. Moreover, to further reduce potential 
endogeneity concerns, the visa policies measure is lagged by one year and, thus, refers to 
policies in 2015. In fact, changes in a country’s overall visa policies are not uncommon 
(although often of moderate magnitude), as shown in Figure 1, which presents a scatterplot of 
the Visa-Free Score in 2016 against the Visa-Free Score in 2015 (along with a 45° line). 
                                                            
3 See https://www.passportindex.org. 
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Other data are compiled from conventional sources. Trade data are obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics. The dyadic control variables are 
computed based on information taken from the CIA World Factbook. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
Column 1 in Table 1 presents the baseline estimation results. In line with expectations, the 
gravity controls work well (that is, exports fall with geographic distance and are larger when 
countries share a land border and official language), while fixed effects for the exporter and 
the importer control for any country-specific determinant of trade (such as a country’s 
economic size and remoteness). The coefficient of interest to me, however, is the estimate of 
the joint effect of the exporter’s and the importer’s visa policies on trade. As shown, the 
effect is estimated to be large, positive and significant, with a point estimate of 1.97 implying 
that a one percentage point increase in the probability of pairwise visa-free travel is associated 
with a two percent increase in bilateral exports. 
In the remaining columns of Table 1, I verify the robustness of this result along a variety of 
dimensions. In columns (2) and (3), I replace exports with respectively imports and average 
trade as regressand, without much effect. In columns (4) and (5), I expand the sample and 
apply techniques that allow me to take into account observations of zero (or unreported) trade. 
While the least squares results are robust to this extension, the estimated  coefficient 
decreases in magnitude and loses statistical precision for Poisson estimation. Since the 
language effect, however, is also no longer statistically distinguishable from zero, I do not 
place much confidence in this estimator in this setting. In column (6), I include, at the cost of 
a reduced sample, additional dyadic controls, which yields a smaller but still highly 
significant  estimate. Intuitively, the point estimate becomes moderately smaller in 
magnitude when I estimate the current (instead of the one-year lagged) effect of visa policies 
on exports, as shown in column (7). 
I also examine the sensitivity of the findings to the functional form of the dyadic variable that 
quantifies the trading partners’ visa policies. Table 2 presents results. In particular, I use the 
pairwise minimum of the exporter’s and the importer’s Visa-Free Score, a binary dummy 
variable which takes the value of one when both countries have a Visa-Free Score that is 
above the sample median (and zero otherwise), and a binary dummy variable which takes the 
value of one when both countries have a Visa-Free Score that is above the 75th percentile of 
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the sample (and zero otherwise). For all these measures, the estimate of  is positive and 
statistically highly significant. The results are also economically plausible. The point estimate 
of  in column (2) implies, for instance, that, holding other things constant, a country’s 
exports are higher by 32 percent when the citizens of both countries enjoy visa-free access to 
more than (the sample median of) 74 countries. When separating the effect between the 
exporter and the importer, visa policies seem to be of relevance for both sides of a trade 
relationship, with a larger effect for the importer. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Cross-border mobility is often associated with cross-border economic exchange. In fact, in 
view of this relationship, restrictions to travel have also been frequently applied as a tool in 
economic diplomacy. 
In this short paper, I examine the empirical association between a country’s visa policies and 
its international trade, using a specification of the gravity model that avoids the endogeneity 
problem of analyses of the pairwise association between ease of travel between countries and 
the extent of bilateral economic activity. In particular, I make use of a new data set which 
allows me to construct a dyadic measure of travel mobility that is independent of the actual 
diplomatic relationship between the two countries. In line with other, previously reported (and 
potentially biased) estimation results, I find that mobility benefits cross-border exchange: 
Countries which engage in diplomacy and manage to issue powerful passports experience 
more international trade. 
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Table 1: The Effect of Visa Policies on Trade 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Exports) Ln(Imports) Ln(Trade) Ln(.01+Exports) Exports Ln(Exports) Ln(Exports, 
2015) 
Estimation Method: OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson OLS  OLS 
Pairwise Product 
Visa-Free Score 
1.966** 
(0.260) 
2.179** 
(0.250) 
1.743** 
(0.244) 
1.792** 
(0.265) 
0.180 
(0.599) 
1.137** 
(0.287) 
1.766** 
(0.263) 
Log (Distance) -1.491** 
(0.024) 
-1.462** 
(0.022) 
-1.396** 
(0.021) 
-1.339** 
(0.024) 
-0.765** 
(0.033) 
-1.374** 
(0.029) 
-1.512** 
(0.024) 
Border 1.096** 
(0.116) 
0.872** 
(0.110) 
1.069** 
(0.110) 
1.563** 
(0.152) 
0.611** 
(0.104) 
0.788** 
(0.115) 
1.101** 
(0.117) 
Common Language 0.737** 
(0.052) 
0.792** 
(0.048) 
0.731** 
(0.048) 
0.890** 
(0.045) 
0.114 
(0.086) 
0.483** 
(0.050) 
0.766** 
(0.052) 
Other Dyadic Controls No No No No No Yes No 
Exporter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Importer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 22,044 23,645 26,734 38,025 38,025 17,965 21,888 
Pseudo R2     0.94   
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.75 0.79 0.77  0.76 0.74 
 
Notes: Regressand and estimator are specified at the top of each column. Other dyadic controls are: log product land area, number landlocked, 
number islands, common colonizer, common country, ever colony, currently colonized, same country, and regional FTA membership. Standard 
errors robust to clustering at the country pair level are in parentheses. ** denotes significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2: Alternative Visa Policy Measures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pairwise Minimum 
Visa-Free Score 
0.006** 
(0.001) 
    
Both with Visa-Free 
Score > Median 
 0.282** 
(0.058) 
   
Both with Visa-Free 
Score > 75% 
  0.512** 
(0.056) 
  
Visa-Free Score 
Exporter 
   0.004** 
(0.000) 
 
Visa-Free Score 
Importer 
    0.010** 
(0.000) 
Log (Distance) -1.486** 
(0.024) 
-1.500** 
(0.023) 
-1.484** 
(0.024) 
-1.500** 
(0.023) 
-1.500** 
(0.023) 
Border 1.097** 
(0.116) 
1.109** 
(0.116) 
1.126** 
(0.116) 
1.109** 
(0.116) 
1.109** 
(0.116) 
Common Language 0.736** 
(0.052) 
0.735** 
(0.052) 
0.742** 
(0.052) 
0.735** 
(0.052) 
0.735** 
(0.052) 
Log (GDP Exporter)    0.822** 
(0.007) 
 
Log (GDP Importer)     1.053** 
(0.008) 
Exporter Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Importer Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Number of Obs. 22,044 22,044 22,044 21,163 21,344 
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.71 0.68 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Regressand is log exports. Standard errors robust to clustering at the 
country pair level are in parentheses. ** denotes significant at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1: Visa-Free Scores over Time 
 
 
Notes: Data are obtained from Arton Capital (https://www.passportindex.org). 
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